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1 INTRODUCTION
European fiscal integration is at crossroads. The
fiscal crisis that has swept through Europe in the
past couple of months has tested European mon-
etary union and made it apparent that the current
institutional setup – and its implementation – is
insufficient. A major overhaul is needed.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, seri-
ous concerns have been expressed about US state
and local government defaults (Gelinas, 2010).
The spectre of 'the mother of all financial crises'
has even been raised should the state of Califor-
nia default (Watkins, 2009). In late February
2010, Jamie Dimon, chairman of JP Morgan
Chase, warned American investors that they
should be more worried about the risk of a Cali-
fornian default than about Greece's current debt
woes1. But the US's state-level fiscal crisis has
received much less attention than the difficulties
in the euro area.
In fact both the US and the euro area face signifi-
cant state-level fiscal crises, which are reflected
by credit default swap (CDS) developments – a
measure of the cost of insurance against govern-
ment default (Figure 1). But neither the euro area
as a whole, nor the US as a whole is going through
a fiscal crisis. Paradoxically, while anxiety about
the euro area has reached a very high level, both
public debt and deficit are noticeably smaller in
the euro area than in the US (Table 1).
It is against this background that this policy con-
tribution aims to answer three questions:
• Why has the euro area been hit so hard?
• How would a more federal European fiscal union
closer to the US model have helped?
• How do the euro area’s fiscal architecture
reform plans stand up in the light of the US
example?
Section 2 briefly compares some general features
of the EU and US fiscal systems. This is followed
by a more detailed comparison of fiscal-crisis pre-
vention and management tools in Section 3. The
lessons are drawn out in Section 4, and some con-
cluding remarks are offered in Section 5.
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Figure 1: Credit default swap on five-year government bonds in selected EU countries and US states,
2 January 2008-15 June 2010
Source: Datastream.
1. http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/finance/financeto
pics/financialcrisis/732
6772/California-is-a-
greater-risk-than-Greece
-warns-JP-Morgan-
chief.htmlZsolt Darvas  FISCAL FEDERALISM IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE US
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2 CENTRALISATION, REDISTRIBUTION, AUTONOMY
AND COMPETITION
It is useful to start with a brief comparison of the
EU and US fiscal systems. Table 2 shows the dis-
tribution of tax revenues in the US: the federal gov-
ernment collects two-thirds, the states one-fifth,
and local government the rest. As state budgets
receive some direct funding from the federal gov-
ernment, the state and local government share of
total spending is somewhat higher than 40 per-
cent. States have a high level of autonomy, there
is a great deal of variation in tax rates and struc-
tures, and tax competition between states is high
(Gichiru et al, 2009; Bloechliger and Rabesona,
2009).
In the EU sovereign countries provide the bulk of
the EU budget in the form of contributions largely
related to their gross national income and value
added tax revenues. EU countries have full auton-
omy in setting their budgets2and tax competition
is pervasive, much like US states.
Figures 2 and 3 on the next page compare the cen-
tralisation of revenues and the distribution of
expenditures by the US federal government and
the EU budget3. There is indeed a huge difference
between the EU and the US. In the US, federal taxes
collected from states range from 12 to 20 percent
of state GDP, and federal monies received by
states range from nine to 31 percent of state GDP
(not considering the District of Columbia). In the
EU, most member states contribute to the
common budget by amounts equivalent to about
0.8-0.9 percent of their GDP, and receive EU funds
in the range of 0.5-3.5 percent of their GDP. As a
consequence, fiscal redistribution is much higher
in the US than in the EU4. Also, while in both areas
redistribution is related to the level of develop-
ment as measured by GDP per capita, the rela-
tionship is much steeper in the US (as shown by
Figure 4 on the page 5).
Table 2. Distribution of revenue by tax type col-
lected by all federal, state, and municipal gov-
ernments in the US, 2006 (%)
2. Within the weak limits of
the EU-wide Stability and
Growth Pact and other EU
regulations, such as state
aid rules.
3. For the US, it is not
straightforward to calculate
a proper balance of
payments between the
federal government and the
states. To our knowledge,
Leonard and Walder (2000)
is the most recent study to
perform such a calculation,
which relates to the 1999
fiscal year and we therefore
use their data.
4. Cohesion fund
disbursement for the
countries that joined the EU
in 2004 and 2007 is set to
increase from about 0.7
percent of the combined
GDP of these countries in
2008, to above two percent
by 2012. Hence
redistribution will increase
somewhat, but will continue
to remain well below US
levels.
Euro area US
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
General government budget balance (% GDP) -6.3 -6.6 -6.1 -11.0 -10.0 -9.9
General government gross debt (% GDP)* 78.7 84.7 88.5 103.6 116.0 122.0
GDP growth (% change) -4.1 0.9 1.5 -2.4 2.8 2.5
Inflation (% change) 0.3 1.5 1.7 -0.4 1.7 0.3
Employment growth (% change) -2.1 -1.0 0.1 -3.8 -0.4 0.6
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 9.4 10.3 10.4 9.3 9.7 9.8
Current account balance (% GDP) ** -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -3.0 -3.7 -3.7
Table 1: The euro area versus the US: some key indicators, 2009-2011
* US government debt data is the sum of federal, state and local government debt – the concept better corresponds to the ‘gen-
eral government debt’ statistics of the EU. US federal government debt is 83.3, 94.3, and 99.0 percent of GDP in 2009, 2010,
and 2011 respectively. It is notable that the US data is published by the IMF as ‘General government gross debt’ and by the
European Commission as ‘General government consolidated gross debt’, and this is almost identical to what the US Census
Bureau calls ‘Gross federal debt’, ie not including state and local government debt. ** The values reported for the euro area are
estimates correcting for reporting errors.
Source: European Commission (2010) for all data except US government debt, which is from http://www.usgovern-
mentspending.com/federal_state_local_debt_chart.html
Federal State Local
Property tax 0 3 97
General sales tax 0 80 20
Selective sales/excise taxes 36 52 12
Individual income tax 80 19 2
Corporate income tax 87 12 1
Motor vehicle license 0 93 7
Social insurance/retirement 100 0 0
Other taxes 54 30 16
Total taxes 67 20 13
Source: Gichiru et al (2009), Table 3, page 12.FISCAL FEDERALISM IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE US Zsolt Darvas
04
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
o
f
 
C
o
l
u
m
b
i
a
N
e
w
 
M
e
x
i
c
o
M
o
n
t
a
n
a
W
e
s
t
 
V
i
r
g
i
n
i
a
M
i
s
s
i
s
s
i
p
p
i
N
o
r
t
h
 
D
a
k
o
t
a
V
i
r
g
i
n
i
a
A
l
a
s
k
a
A
l
a
b
a
m
a
H
a
w
a
i
i
S
o
u
t
h
 
D
a
k
o
t
a
O
k
l
a
h
o
m
a
A
r
k
a
n
s
a
s
M
a
i
n
e
M
a
r
y
l
a
n
d
L
o
u
i
s
i
a
n
a
K
e
n
t
u
c
k
y
S
o
u
t
h
 
C
a
r
o
l
i
n
a
M
i
s
s
o
u
r
i
I
d
a
h
o
A
r
i
z
o
n
a
T
e
n
n
e
s
s
e
e
I
o
w
a
R
h
o
d
e
 
I
s
l
a
n
d
V
e
r
m
o
n
t
K
a
n
s
a
s
W
y
o
m
i
n
g
N
e
b
r
a
s
k
a
P
e
n
n
s
y
l
v
a
n
i
a
U
t
a
h
N
o
r
t
h
 
C
a
r
o
l
i
n
a
F
l
o
r
i
d
a
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
T
e
x
a
s
O
h
i
o
I
n
d
i
a
n
a
W
a
s
h
i
n
g
t
o
n
O
r
e
g
o
n
C
o
l
o
r
a
d
o
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
D
e
l
a
w
a
r
e
M
a
s
s
a
c
h
u
s
e
t
t
s
N
e
w
 
Y
o
r
k
W
i
s
c
o
n
s
i
n
M
i
c
h
i
g
a
n
M
i
n
n
e
s
o
t
a
N
e
v
a
d
a
I
l
l
i
n
o
i
s
N
e
w
 
H
a
m
p
s
h
i
r
e
N
e
w
 
J
e
r
s
e
y
C
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
c
u
t -10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Taxes
Spending 
Balance
Figure 2: US federal budget: taxes from, spending in, and balance with states, 1999, % state GDP
Source: Author’s calculations using data from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/taubmancenter/publications/fisc/ (fiscal data) and OECD
regional database (GDP).
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BOX 1: FISCAL FEDERALISM
“The traditional theory of fiscal federalism lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of
functions to different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these
functions (e.g., Richard Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972).”(Oates, 1999, p. 1121). Through fiscal operations
at federal government and regional level, and through direct fiscal transfers across regions, a federal fiscal
system typically provides redistribution (permanent transfers mostly from richer to poorer regions), sta-
bilisation (counter-cyclical federal government fiscal policy when all regions are hit by a common shock)
and risk-sharing (temporary transfers when only one region or some regions are hit by a region-specific
shock). In practice, there are various forms of fiscal federation (see eg von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996;
Gichiru et al, 2009; or Bloechliger et al, 2010), even though the US has always been the main point of ref-
erence. Europe’s supranational formation, the EU, can also be regarded as a form of fiscal federalism,
since certain functions, such as the common agricultural policy or cohesion policy, are largely centralised.
The literature on fiscal federalism is voluminous; see for example the recent handbook edited by Ahmad
and Brosio (2006) and its extensive reference list. Our policy contribution deals with a single issue: the
prevention and management of state fiscal crises in the EU and the US.Zsolt Darvas  FISCAL FEDERALISM IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE US
05
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
3 CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT
The huge differences in centralisation and redis-
tribution, however, do not tell us much about the
potential role of the EU and US fiscal systems in
preventing and managing state-level fiscal crises,
which, as noted in the introduction, is a problem
both for the EU and the US.
We compare the euro area with the US in eight
ways. Firstly, there are three main areas that, in
principle, can help to prevent or alleviate state-
level crises in a federal system:
1 Fiscal rules: fiscal rules in a federal system,
such as the US, tend to be much more stringent
than in the EU/euro area. Thus there is less
potential for irresponsible behaviour. Most US
states have balanced budget rules in their con-
stitutions: a study concluded that 36 states
have rigorous balanced-budget requirements,
four have weak requirements, and the other 10
fall in between those categories (National Con-
ference of State Legislatures, 1999; Snell,
2004). Yet, as Figure 1 shows, CDS on bonds
f r o m  s o m e  U S  s t a t e s 5 increased to higher
values than any euro-area country after the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008,
and current US state CDSs are similar to those
of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, though
none have reached current Greek values. Cali-
fornia, whose fiscal rules belong to the 'most
stringent' category noted above, is perhaps in
the deepest trouble among US states. Its cash
constraints even led to the issuance of vouch-
ers to the value of $2.6 billion between July and
September 2009, which may in fact be consid-
ered to be an event very similar to a default6.
2 Less scope for state/local debt:because a high
share of revenues and expenditures are cen-
tralised in a federal system, and state-level
fiscal rules are in general strict, state spending,
even if irresponsible, does not have the poten-
tial to lead to massive debt/GDP ratios. Indeed,
the combined debt of US states and local gov-
ernments amounted to about 16 percent of US
GDP in 2006. This ratio is expected to rise
5. CDS is available only for
15 of the 50 US states and
hence we can not assess
the other 35 states.
6. Barro (2010) argues that
California has been in a
state of budget crisis for at
least the last seven years,
stemming from institutional
failures.
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Figure 4: Fiscal redistribution within the US and EU vs GDP per capita, (A) individual US states and
EU member states and (B) major regions
Note: data relates to 2008 for EU and 1999 for US. US: federal expenditure in the given state minus federal taxes from the given
state, percent of state GDP. In panel A, District of Columbia (300, 40.8%) is not shown for better readability. EU: total EU expenditure
(less administration) in the given country minus total country contribution to the EU budget, percent of country GDP. In panel A
Luxembourg (276.1, -0.03%) is not shown for better readability. See the explanation of the two-digit regional codes in the
appendix. Group values are weighted averages; weights were derived from nominal GDP. For the US we used the divisions defined
by the Census Bureau (District of Columbia is not included in the South Atlantic average). For the EU the groups are the following:
CEE10: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; MED5: Cyprus,
Greece, Malta, Portugal and Spain; UK&IE: Ireland and the United Kingdom; NORD3: Denmark, Finland, and Sweden; ABLN4: Austria,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; France (FR), Germany (DE) and Italy (IT) are shown separately.
Source: See Figures 2 and 3.
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somewhat by 2010 to 22 percent on average
(Figure 5)7 with reasonably small cross-state
differences: the range is from 9.3 percent in
Wyoming to 33.0 percent in Rhode Island
(source: www.usgovernmentspending.com). In
the euro area the debt/GDP ratio in 2010
ranges from 19.0 percent in Luxembourg to
124.9 percent in Greece (European Commis-
sion, 2010). However, the lower US state and
local government debt/GDP ratios can be serv-
iced from lower revenues, as a substantial frac-
tion of revenues must be transferred to the
fiscal centre.
3 Federal stabilisation policy may help to avoid
pro-cyclicality:There are good reasons to dele-
gate counter-cyclical fiscal policy to the centre
(IMF, 2009; Martin, 1998): it allows better or
easier policy coordination, exploits economies
of scale by relying on a large tax base and
better borrowing conditions, and also provides
risk-sharing opportunities. During the current
crisis, the US federal government indeed
allowed automatic stabilisers to run and
adopted a major discretionary stimulus includ-
ing direct help to state budgets. In the EU, such
counter-cyclical policies were left to each
member state with some attempt made at
coordination. But have fiscal outcomes been
different in the EU and the US?
In the US counter-cyclical fiscal policy directed
from the centre was counter-balanced by fiscal
consolidation at state level. McNichol and John-
son (2010) calculate a measure of state budget
shortfall (the difference between projected rev-
enues for each year and a ‘current services’ base-
line) that reflects state fiscal conditions before
deficit-closing actions are taken. States use a
combination of measures to close the deficits,
including deployment of federal stimulus funds,
budget cuts, tax increases and reserves8. Table 3
shows that, while state budgets have indeed
received direct federal support through the Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and
states could rely to some extent the reserves
accumulated in their rainy-day funds, but spend-
ing cuts and tax increases could not be avoided.
7. During the same years,
federal government debt
has increased from 63
percent to 94 percent of
US GDP. The small
increase in state and
local debt is largely due
to fiscal consolidation
required by fiscal rules.
8. Following the recession
of the early 1980s, the
number of US states
with rainy-day funds
rose from 12 in 1982 to
38 in 1989, and to 45 in
1995. The aim of these
funds is to smooth
public spending during
recessions and,
possibly, increase public
savings over the
business cycle. See Box
1 in Ter-Minassian
(2007).
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Figure 5: US gross public debt: federal, state, and local, 1902-2012 (percent of US GDP)
Note. 2010-2012 values (plus 2009 value for states and 2008-2009 values for local governments) are estimates (partly based
on budgets) by usgovernmentspending.com. Source: http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal_state_local_debt_chart.html.
2009 2010 2011 2012
State budget shortfall
(total of all states) 110 200 180 120
Covered by
American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act 39 63 36 1
Spending cuts 74
Tax and fee increases 34
Other/Use of reserves 29
Table 3: Estimated US state budget shortfall in
each fiscal year, US$ billion
Sources: Total and ARRA contribution: Figure 3 on page 5 of
McNichol and Johnson (2010); others: CBPP preliminary
unpublished estimates based on a sample of states.Zsolt Darvas  FISCAL FEDERALISM IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE US
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Similarly, Bloechliger et al (2010, p 19) note that
among OECD countries “the USA is probably the
most notable case of pro-cyclical reactions from
sub-central governments”. They also report a con-
temporaneous correlation between net lending
and output gaps, which is 0.36 for the federal gov-
ernment (implying counter-cyclicality), but -0.38
for US states (implying pro-cyclicality). Using lags,
the correlation coefficient for states is around 
-0.66 implying even stronger pro-cyclicality.
In a more formal study, Aizenman and Pasricha
(2010) assessed the aggregate impact of federal
and state spending during 2008/2009. They con-
cluded that the big federal stimulus broadly com-
pensated for the contraction of state level
spending. In net terms, stimulus was close to zero
in the US in 2008/2009. And by studying seven
fiscal federations (including the US) and about
two decades of data mostly from the 1980s and
1990s, Rodden and Wibbels (2010) conclude that
pro-cyclical fiscal policy among provincial gov-
ernments can easily overwhelm the stabilising
policies of central governments.
These results are for the average of the US states:
in more distressed states, the combined effect of
federal and state spending may have led to pro-
cyclical fiscal policy. Figure 6 shows that states'
own spending was cut on average by about four
percent in the fiscal year 2009 and about an addi-
tional seven percent in the fiscal year 2010, but
there were some states with much higher cuts, eg
12 states cut own spending by more than 10 per-
cent (and four others between 9 and 10 percent)
in the fiscal year 2010.
In the EU, during the first phase of the crisis in
2008/09, almost all euro-area members adopted
discretionary fiscal measures. The exceptions
were Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Slovakia (accord-
ing to the European Commission(2009). But pri-
mary balances also worsened between 2008 and
2009 in these countries, implying that, at the very
least, automatic stabilisers were allowed to work9.
In 2010, Greece adopted several fiscal austerity
programmes, and Portugal and Spain also speed-
ed-up fiscal consolidation, while Italy announced
plans for 2011. More recently France and Ger-
many set out plans for 2011 and beyond. In our
view France and Germany should not rush to fiscal
consolidation at a time when European recovery
9. The change in primary
balances between 2008
and 2009 were the
following: in Greece from -
3.1 percent to -8.5 percent,
in Italy from +2.5 percent to
-0.6 percent, in Cyprus from
+3.7 percent to -3.6
percent, and in Slovakia
from -1.1  percent to -5.3
percent (all values are
expressed in percent of
GDP; source: European
Commission, 2010). In
Greece, the 2009 recession
was reasonably mild, GDP
fell by 2 percent only,
suggesting that the
ballooning primary deficit
may have also represented
discretionary counter-
cyclical fiscal policy
(perhaps partly as a
consequence of a loose
budget ahead of the late
2009 parliamentary
elections).
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Figure 6: General fund state spending in the US, fiscal years 1990-2010 (annual % change)
Note. General Fund: the predominant fund for financing a state’s operations; revenues are received from broad-based state taxes.
All data refers to the fiscal year (which ends in most states in June of each year). The time series for ‘all states’ is taken from the
Spring 2010 Survey. Data for each state and for each year was taken from the Fall Surveys (except in 2010) and correspond to
changes of expenditure in current fiscal year compared to the previous year, where previous fiscal year data is ‘actual’ and the
current fiscal year data is ‘preliminary actual’. The 2010 fiscal year data is the estimate published in June 2010.
Source: The Fiscal Survey of States, Fall Surveys and Spring 2010 Survey, National Governors’ Association and the National
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is still fragile and private sector deleveraging is
still expected. Nevertheless, in 2010, the fiscal
stance is still expansionary in most euro-area
countries, including Germany and France.
While final fiscal numbers for 2010 are not yet
available, it is fair to say that there are states both
in the euro area and the US that had to deal with
pro-cyclical fiscal policy a some point during the
crisis, and there are states that could benefit from
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Therefore, from the
point of view of actual outcomes, the superiority
of federal stabilisation policy cannot be estab-
lished when we compare the euro area to the US10.
The next three areas in which the EU and the US
can be compared indicate significant similarities
in the context of the resolution of fiscal crises:
4 No orderly default mechanism: neither the EU
nor the US has a default mechanism for, in the
EU case member states, and in the US case
states (although the US has a default mecha-
nism for lower levels of government, though
under stricter rules than for private corpora-
tions; see Gelinas, 2010).
5 No bail-out from the centre:at least prior to the
crisis, there were no bail-out or short-term
financing mechanisms in the US for states, or
in the EU for euro-area governments. President
Gerald Ford at first refused New York city a bail-
out in 1975, and President Barack Obama said
no to California in 2009. In the former case, ulti-
mately both the US federal government and
New York state provided loans to the city, but
they imposed a financial control board that
required deep cuts to services, a new, more
transparent budget process and several years
of budgetary oversight (Malanga, 2009). But it
was in Europe, not the US, where a formal emer-
gency lending facility was put together, and it
was the European Central Bank that started to
buy the government bonds of distressed
member states.
6 No option to devalue the currency and to
inflate the debt:neither euro-area countries nor
US states have the devaluation option, though
it could boost growth and thereby help fiscal
sustainability, or to generate inflation in order
to reduce the real value of debt.
But there are also two fundamental differences
between the EU and the US that have a bearing on
fiscal sustainability:
7 Banking system strength:the US is regarded as
having implemented effective measures to
improve its banking system, while Europe has
not (Véron, 2010). In a federal fiscal system,
where banking regulation and supervision are
also centralised and therefore cross-border
banking issues are not relevant, fixing the
financial system is certainly easier.
8 Labour and product market flexibility:the US is
closer to an optimum currency area than the
EU in these respects. In fact, in the context of
this policy contribution, Mankiw (2010)
reminded us that “the United States in the nine-
teenth century had a common currency, but it
did not have a large, centralised fiscal authori-
ty. The federal government was much smaller
than it is today. In some ways, the US then
looks like Europe today. Yet the common cur-
rency among the states worked out fine.” His
key point is that the common currency worked
well even when there were severe recessions,
because labour markets were much more flex-
ible than in Europe today.
4 LESSONS FOR EUROPE
Although both the euro area and the US have many
similarities in terms of the state-level fiscal crisis,
only the euro area's viability has been questioned,
though the overall fiscal situation is better in the
euro area than in the US.
4.1 Why has the euro area been judged so
harshly?
A simple, but in our view insufficient, answer is
that the Greek fiscal problems are much more seri-
ous than fiscal problems in any US state. Greece
10. Fatás (1998) compared
the EU and the US in
terms of fiscal stabilisa-
tion and risk-sharing us-
ing, of course, data from
the pre-EMU period. He
concluded that the dif-
ferences between the
federal US system and
the decentralised EU
system are not as great
as previously thought.
He argued that the po-
tential to provide interre-
gional insurance by cre-
ating a European fiscal
federation is too small to
compensate for the
many problems associ-
ated with its design and
implementation.Zsolt Darvas  FISCAL FEDERALISM IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE US
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has a real solvency problem: high debt, high
deficit, weak tax-collection capability, social
unrest and a loss of confidence. No US state is in
a similar situation. Even if the current IMF/euro-
area financing programme goes ahead as
planned, the Greek debt/GDP ratio would stabilise
at around 150 percent of GDP in a country with
very weak fiscal institutions. Should any other
negative shock arrive, or should the programme
not go ahead as planned, Greece will not be able
to avoid default or debt rescheduling.
A second reason for the more serious fiscal crisis
in the euro area is that a Greek default may have
more severe contagious effects within the euro
area than would the default of a state in the US.
Debt levels in euro-area member states are much
higher (both relative to GDP and in absolute
terms) than in US states, and a significant share
of euro-area sovereign debt is held by European
banks, while in the US residents hold a large part
of state debt. Little is known in Europe about the
resistance of individual banking groups to even-
tual sovereign defaults (Gros and Mayer, 2010),
though for the banking system as a whole there
seems to be a sufficient buffer (OECD, 2010).
A third factor is the ambiguous policy response.
When the Greek crisis began to intensify in Febru-
ary 2010, the Greek government was hesitant
about adopting further consolidation measures,
and European partners dithered over making a
loan to Greece and agreeing to IMF involvement
(which, by the way, is not prohibited by any EU
regulation). As the crisis intensified, policymak-
ers started to blame ‘speculation’11, or suggest ad
hoc measures, such as banning certain financial
products and setting up a European credit rating
agency. When policymakers are busy with these
kinds of redundant activities and provide conflict-
ing signals about their intentions, markets are
likely to draw the conclusion that policymakers do
not have the means to resolve the crisis.
Last but not least, the euro-area institutional set-
up may have also played a role, with the lack of a
strong federal government, which ultimately
would have had ample resources to bail-out big
banking groups or even perhaps states. Gros and
Mayer (2010) also rightly point out that the US
Treasury and the Federal Reserve stand shoulder-
to-shoulder, each one providing a guarantee for
the other, which is not the case in the euro-area.
Also, while the euro is much more than a simple
economic endeavour, the commitment of the US
to the US dollar is certainly stronger than the
commitment of euro-area nations to the euro,
even if the eventual exit of a member state or a full
break-up of the euro-area would lead to an eco-
nomic chaos (Eichengreen, 2007).
4.2 How would a more federalist European fiscal
union have helped?
A more federalist EU/euro area would have helped
to prevent and resolve the current state-level
fiscal crisis in various ways.
1 It would have increased the political coherence
of the euro area. Since a major factor behind the
euro-area fiscal crisis is low confidence related
to governance deficiencies and the inability of
European authorities to strengthen the euro-
area banking system, a higher level of fiscal
federation, and also political federation, would
have boosted confidence. Furthermore, it would
have meant fewer opportunities for policymak-
ers in member states and European institutions
to express conflicting views. While being an
important argument for a more federalist
Europe, these political aspects should not nec-
essarily be a problem if other items on the list
are fixed, resulting in the minimising of the the
potential for an area-wide crisis on one hand,
and clear procedures on how to resolve an area-
wide crisis on the other.
2 It would have given scope for greater redistrib-
ution, risk sharing, and a federal counter-cycli-
cal fiscal policy that may have dampened the
effect of consolidation in those few member
states that started to consolidate in 2010.We
have already argued that the superiority of the
US fiscal stabilisation policy over to Europe's
cannot be established. Even in the US the moral
hazard involved in federal counter-cyclical
11. While theoretical
models make the case for
pure self-fulfilling crises,
the current euro-area fiscal
crisis is not one. It was not
accidental that Greece was
attacked and not, for
example, Finland, and it
was also not accidental that
Portugal was threatened
most by contagion and not,
for example, Slovakia. The
perceived fragility of the
European banking industry
was a key contributor to the
fear of contagion.FISCAL FEDERALISM IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE US Zsolt Darvas
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fiscal policy is a major consideration (Aizen-
man and Pasricha, 2010). This would not be
different for Europe. However, it is important to
emphasise that the lack of a European federal
stabilisation policy is only consistent with
counter-cyclical country-level fiscal rules and
therefore this feature should be incorporated in
country-specific rules and be maintained or
even strengthened in the SGP12. 
We intentionally do not discuss here the broad-
er issue related to the level of redistribution,
because it is, as eg Oates (1999) argues, a
contentious and a very complex economic and
political issue. We only note that Greece, the
main culprit of the current euro-area crisis, was
the highest net beneficiary (as a percent of
GDP) of intra-EU redistribution (Figure 2), and
it has received much more than what the rela-
tionship between net balance with the EU and
GDP per capita would suggest (Figure 3A). It
was not the low level of intra-EU redistribution
that caused the crisis. Similarly, public risk
sharing is also a contentious issue. Its desir-
ability depends on, among other things, private
risk sharing. But financial integration advanced
to very high levels within the euro area, which
can substitute public risk sharing.
3 It would have reduced the scope for state-level
crises through stricter pre-crisis state-level
fiscal rules. It is inevitable that measures will
be taken to implement fiscal rules more effec-
tively than has been done under the SGP. But
this does not necessarily require a fiscal feder-
ation. Most US states have constitutional fiscal
rules – the approach adopted recently by Ger-
many. Other euro-area members may also
choose this approach, preferably augmented
with the introduction of independent fiscal
councils (Calmfors et al, 2010), thereby
increasing their credibility and fiscal sustain-
ability. While these improvements would be
beneficial, there is an even better way to
enforce fiscal discipline: the introduction of a
common Eurobond up to a limit of 60 percent
of member states’ GDP, as we shall discuss in
the next section.
4 It would have helped to strengthen the euro-
area banking industry and to introduce euro-
area-wide banking-resolution schemes.
Resolving European cross-border banking-
sector crises seems to be a tough job and,
indeed, looking at our list, this is the best argu-
ment for a more federal approach. As discussed
in the previous section, the perceived fragility
of the euro-area banking industry was a major
reason why the Greek crisis has caused so
many problems. But, in principle at least, bank-
ing crisis resolution can be done through a
burden-sharing mechanism without creating a
US-style federal fiscal system. The implemen-
tation of EU/euro-area-wide banking supervi-
sion and regulation is not impossible within the
current institutional setup. 
4.3 How do the euro area’s fiscal architecture
reform plans stand up in the light of the US
example?
Numerous solutions to the euro area's fiscal crisis
have been put forward. Current discussions sug-
gest that reform of the euro-area governance
framework will mostly comprise:
1 Better enforcement of fiscal discipline, which
in turn will likely have two key components:
• Stricter enforcement of current rules, partly
through fines;
• More fiscal coordination.
2 The €440 billion three-year European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) may be turned to a per-
manent emergency financing mechanism for
euro-area member states funded (or guaran-
teed) primarily from national contributions; the
‘The lack of a European federal stabilisation policy is only consistent with counter-cyclical
country-level fiscal rules and therefore this feature should be incorporated in country-specific
rules and be maintained or even strengthened in the Stability and Growth Pact.’
12. While the SGP required
EU countries to have
budget positions close
to balance or in surplus
in the medium term, the
actual interpretation
and implementation re-
lied instead on the three
percent deficit ceiling.
During the crisis, how-
ever, the Commission
has – rightly – invited
all EU countries to break
the three percent deficit
ceiling.Zsolt Darvas  FISCAL FEDERALISM IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE US
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Commission’s €60 billion European Stabilisa-
tion Mechanism (ESM) may also be made per-
manent;
3 Active involvement of the ECB in state-level
crisis management, and
4 Surveillance of private-sector imbalances and
better harmonisation of economic policies.
These proposals would introduce institutions that
do not exist for the US states, though they cer-
tainly would imply higher levels of integration.
Since the EU has a completely different political
set-up to the US, and since the level of government
debt in euro-area member states is very diverse,
European solutions need not follow the US model. 
Nevertheless, both the EFSF and the ECB’s active
involvement are, to some extent, substitutes for
the lack of a substantial federal European budget.
US federal spending in US states is of course not
to be repaid by the states. In Europe, loans, not
transfers, were provided to Greece, and the EFSF
and ESM will also provide, if needed, loans condi-
tional on the implementation of a programme. In
this way, these European institutions help
member states when they face difficulties in
obtaining market financing13. But since we have
argued that it was not the lack of higher redistrib-
ution across European countries that caused the
crisis, and also that greater redistribution is not
the solution, the EFSF indeed substitutes to some
extent the lack of a higher EU budget.
Also, the move of the ECB to give special treatment
to Greece via its collateral policy, and to purchase
the government bonds of just a few euro-area
countries breaches the barrier between monetary
and fiscal authorities, because these actions
reduce the cost of borrowing for euro-area gov-
ernments. Both conditional lending and the ECB’s
purchase of government securities may give rise
to public risk sharing, as we shall argue below.
While progress with the current European reform
proposals would certainly improve the euro-area
policy framework compared to before the crisis,
we doubt that points one, two and three in the list
at the start of this section really represent the
best path towards reform of the euro-area fiscal
architecture. There are two main reasons for our
doubts: credibility (which primarily relates to
fiscal discipline enforcement tools) and political
risk (which primarily relates to the EFSF and the
ECB’s involvement).
Credibility of the new instruments: much will of
course depend on the details of the new frame-
work. So far, the credibility of any European instru-
ment has been damaged by a series of U-turns. We
can give four major examples. First, until February
2010 the euro-area had a framework in which no
support was to be provided to fiscally profligate
countries: this principle was dropped very quickly
to help out a country that has flouted the rules
extensively14. Second, during the crisis, the Euro-
pean Central Bank has substantially reduced the
quality requirements for collaterals eligible for refi-
nancing operations, but planned to return to pre-
crisis standards by January 2011. Until early
2010, the ECB very explicitly denied that it would
switch its planned return of collateral policy back
to pre-crisis standards. Since the credit rating of
Greek government bonds has been downgraded,
a return to pre-crisis collateral policy has raised
the risk of exclusion of Greek government bonds.
But the ECB first postponed the return and later
even abolished any credit rating requirement for
Greek government bonds (and just for Greek
bonds). Third, many European policymakers
strongly opposed IMF involvement in the rescue
of a euro-area country, but there was a U-turn in
this respect as well. Fourth, the ECB long denied
the need for, and its willingness to, purchase gov-
ernment bonds of distressed member states, but
it has since done exactly this. These U-turns in
many cases were reactions to events, but if it is
believed there will be similar changes to the new
instruments in the future, their credibility will be
undermined from the outset.
Political risk: the emergency financing mecha-
nism for euro-area member states carries a sig-
nificant political risk15. If donor countries must
pay too much to help out others, especially if
some of those others have been irresponsible in
the past and they eventually default, then the cit-
13. The US government also
helped US states and local
governments to borrow
through the Build America
Bond (BAB) programme
(Ang et al, 2010). This
programme is designed to
help state and local
governments pursue
various capital projects.
Therefore, BAB is very much
different from the European
lending facilities, which
provide general funding for
budget deficits. 
14. Article 122 of Treaty,
which allows the provision
of financial assistance to a
Member State when
“exceptional occurrences
beyond its control”occur,
was certainly not applicable
for the bail-out of Greece.
15. There are many other
well founded arguments
against a formal emergency
financing mechanism and
even for allowing member
states to default
sometimes, see eg Wyplosz
(2009), Enderlein (2010),
Mélitz (2010), or Cochrane
(2010).FISCAL FEDERALISM IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE US Zsolt Darvas
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izens and politicians of donor countries will be
deterred from risking future losses. The IMF and
EU loans have seniority over previous market-
financed debt and therefore an eventual default
may not necessarily imply direct losses for donor
countries. But when emergency lending amounts
to a significant fraction of the GDP of the recipient
country, losses even of senior loans cannot be
excluded in the event of default. Furthermore,
since the ECB has purchased government debt
securities that now have junior status, direct
losses can arise there. Also, an eventual default,
the possibility of which has previously been stren-
uously denied, may bring into question the relia-
bility of similar financing programmes and could
also raise the risk perception of donors. The even-
tual consequences of the denial of future funding
by some donor countries could be disastrous,
especially if it happens after the current three-
year temporary EFSF is transferred into a perma-
nent facility.
Given the above risks, what would then be a proper
way to reform the euro-area’s fiscal architecture?
It is clear that more fiscal discipline is needed and
it is also clear that a simple elimination of the
EFSF after its expiry without any bold action to put
something new in place would risk a wave of
uncertainty. A clear, credible and simple solution is
needed. Such a solution could be the introduction
of a common Eurobond as suggested by Delpla
and von Weizsäcker (2010). Member states
would be entitled to issue jointly guaranteed
Eurobonds, but only up to 60 percent of GDP (‘blue
bond’). They would issue any additional bond with
their own guarantee (‘red bond’). The blue bond
would be senior to the red bond and an orderly
sovereign default mechanism could be put in
place for the red bonds. By construction, this
would mean a credible commitment by euro-area
partners to not bail-out the red part of sovereign
debt. Thereby, this mechanism would provide an
extremely strong incentive for countries to con-
vince markets that their red debt is safe, promot-
ing fiscal discipline much more powerfully than
any other fiscal coordination proposal currently
on the table. Being both sensible and bold, the
introduction of blue and red bonds would carry a
strong political message that Europe’s integration
cannot be reversed16.
5 SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
The euro area faces a deep crisis while the US does
not, although the overall fiscal situation and out-
look is better in the euro area than in the US, and
although the US also faces serious state-level
fiscal crises. Pre-1999 critics of the euro project,
who stressed its fragility because of the low level
of labour mobility and the lack of fiscal and politi-
cal union, now feel that their concerns have been
vindicated.
But is there proof that the euro is not viable with-
out a federalist fiscal architecture? Our answer is
no, even though there is no doubt that such an
architecture would have helped to prevent out-of-
control state-level debts and allow smoother res-
olution of banking-system problems, as the US
example clearly demonstrates. Also, a more feder-
alist set-up would be a signal of the political coher-
ence of the euro area and would offer less scope to
European policymakers to alarm markets with
conflicting commentaries.
Indeed, the euro area's current fiscal woes prima-
rily originate from the risk that a single country
will default and from the fear of contagion to other
countries and the banking system, which is per-
ceived to be fragile. These fears were amplified by
the ambiguous policy response and the institu-
tional deficiencies of euro-area governance. But
the origin of the euro-area fiscal crisis is not the
lack of a federal fiscal institution with higher redis-
tribution, stabilisation and risk-sharing roles,
which are the typical activities of a fiscal union.
16. As an important ‘by-
product’, higher volume
and increased liquidity
of the Blue bond com-
pared to bond market of
any current member
state, including the mar-
kets for German Bunds,
would provide a more at-
tractive alternative to US
Treasuries for outside in-
vestors, and thereby
even Germany would
benefit from lower
yields.
‘Has the euro-area crisis proved that the euro is not viable without a federalist fiscal
architecture? Our answer is no, though such an architecture would have helped to prevent out-
of-control state-level debts and allow smoother resolution of banking system problems.’Zsolt Darvas  FISCAL FEDERALISM IN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR EUROPE FROM THE US
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The case for a federal stabilisation instrument can
only be made if new reforms will constrain
member states in carrying out counter-cyclical
policy in bad times, while not forcing it on them in
good times. 
There is a large number of proposals on the table
about the redesign of the euro-area policy frame-
work, and the most likely outcomes will not make
Europe’s fiscal framework more similar to that of
the US. Considering various aspects of crisis pre-
vention and management this is not necessarily a
problem, if Europe can find effective solutions to
the challenges of its institutional set-up and cross-
border banking issues. 
It still needs to be seen if Europe will be able to
implement proper reforms. Among the most likely
outcomes, the expected scrutiny of private sector
imbalances is to be welcomed enthusiastically,
but we are doubtful about the other likely ele-
ments of the new framework, namely the strength-
ening of current rules possibly through fines, more
fiscal policy coordination, an emergency financ-
ing mechanism and the ECB’s active involvement
in the management of sovereign debt crises. While
these would be improvements compared to the
current set-up, they may not be effective and
could lead to even more disputes among member
states and European institutions, and they may
simply require further change should new cir-
cumstances emerge. Therefore, these new instru-
ments may not be seen as sufficiently credible.
Lack of credibility of new instruments may trans-
late into continued concerns about the viability of
the euro project, which could deter investment
and negatively impact economic activity, even in
fiscally sound countries. The permanent emer-
gency-financing mechanism could create moral
hazard and carries a serious political risk: donor
countries may decline to provide further funding
after an eventual sovereign default.
Instead of requesting huge sums of money from
euro-area partners to bail-out actual or perceived
profligate countries, designing new fines with a
potential of future overlooking, and creating more
platforms for fiscal coordination with the potential
of even more unsettled disputes, it would be much
more reasonable to introduce a common Eurobond
along the lines of Delpla and von Weizsäcker
(2010). That would bring about much more fiscal
discipline than any other fiscal coordination and
enforcement proposal currently on the table,
would create a large, liquid, and therefore attrac-
tive Eurobond market, and would carry a strong
message about the irreversible nature of European
integration. The three-year period during which the
current EFSF will be in place is sufficient to prop-
erly design the Eurobond. This period should also
be used to fix the fragility of the euro area’s bank-
ing system.
Yet the euro area has a more entrenched problem
than the fiscal sustainability of some of its
member states: the inability of some Mediter-
ranean economies to address their competitive-
ness problems within the euro area (European
Commission, 2008; Darvas, 2010; Marzinotto,
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2010), which has already
led to disappointing growth performance in Italy
and Portugal during the first decade of the euro,
and unfortunately Greece and Spain may join this
club. This problem is more difficult to solve than
the fiscal crisis, because fostering private sector
adjustment is very hard and depends not just on
government decisions. Also, since Europe is cul-
turally diverse, solutions that work in one country
may not work in another. Helping member states
with serious competitiveness problems to design
and accept necessary structural reforms is of
utmost importance, as are measures to move the
whole euro area, including its labour market,
towards an optimum currency area.
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APPENDIX:
Regional codes for Figure 4A 
European Union
AT Austria
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
CY Cyprus
CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany
DK Denmark
EE Estonia
ES Spain
FI Finland
FR France
GR Greece
HU Hungary
IE Ireland
IT Italy
LT Lithuania
LU Luxembourg
LV Latvia
MT Malta
NL Netherlands
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RO Romania
SE Sweden
SI Slovenia
SK Slovakia
UK United Kingdom
USA
AK Alaska
AL Alabama
AR Arkansas
AZ Arizona
CA California
CO Colorado
CT Connecticut
DC District of Columbia
DE Delaware
FL Florida
GA Georgia
HI Hawaii
IA Iowa
ID Idaho
IL Illinois
IN Indiana
KS Kansas
KY Kentucky
LA Louisiana
MA Massachusetts
MD Maryland
ME Maine
MI Michigan
MN Minnesota
MO Missouri
MS Mississippi
MT Montana
NC North Carolina
ND North Dakota
NE Nebraska
NH New Hampshire
NJ New Jersey
NM New Mexico
NV Nevada
NY New York
OH Ohio
OK Oklahoma
OR Oregon
PA Pennsylvania
RI Rhode Island
SC South Carolina
SD South Dakota
TN Tennessee
TX Texas
UT Utah
VA Virginia
VT Vermont
WA Washington
WI Wisconsin
WV West Virginia
WY Wyoming